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Abstract
This article explores the relationship between law and more specifically international law with
territory and borders and how this relationship manifests itself in cyberspace. It claims that it
manifests itself through two processes: a process of territorialisation of cyberspace that is, the
application of territorial notions of international law to persons, activities, and objects existing
or operating in or through cyberspace and, secondly, in States asserting their sovereignty in
cyberspace by creating national cyberspace zones. All in all, its main claim is that borders are
still relevant in the legal regulation of cyberspace.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Law and borders –geographic or normative - have an intimate
relationship. One may even say that they share some form of a
causal relationship. On the one hand, a law produces and determines
borders whereas, on the other, borders produce and determine laws.
The relationship between law and borders is even more pronounced
in international law where borders and indeed territorial borders play
a constitutive as well as a functional role in international law. First,
borders are constitutive of states and, consequently, they are constitutive
of international law. To explain, states are territorially bounded entities;
they represent exclusive authority over a discrete patch of territory.
International law is the product of interactions between such bounded
authorities. Borders thus define international law’s source of authority;
without states, there would be no international law. Second, borders play
a functional role by demarcating international law to wit, by separating
international law from domestic law. They determine in other words
what lies inside and becomes the subject of domestic law and what lies
outside and becomes the subject of international law. Borders are also
functional in that they demarcate international law’s different domains,
for example, international criminal law, environmental law and so on.
Copyright © 2018 – Helena Varkkey, Published by Lembaga Pengkajian Hukum Internasional
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The application of each domain depends on criteria and conditions laid
down by international law. In this sense, one can speak of normative
borders rather than physical ones. All these show that borders shape our
conception of international law and of the regulatory frameworks that
apply to international phenomena.
This paper will explain the relationship between borders and
international law in cyberspace and its implications for the legal
governance of cyberspace. This is an important endeavour because
cyberspace and its features of a-territoriality and borderlessness
seem to defy traditional notions of international legal regulation. The
question then of whether international law can act as a regulatory tool in
cyberspace and, if it does, what is the scope of its regulatory competence
and the question of whether states can remain the source of regulation in
cyberspace are closely linked to the question of whether the constitutive
and functional role of borders can be replicated in cyberspace. The latter
question lies behind the debates on cyber regulation and will be tackled
in this article.
The article will thus proceed by elucidating in the second section the
relationship between international law, borders, territory, and statehood.
The third section will throw a critical gaze on the existing debates
concerning the place and role of international law in cyberspace. The
fourth section will examine the phenomenon of territorialisation of
cyberspace and its implications for the application of international law
to cyberspace whereas the fifth section will examine the phenomenon of
realigning sovereignty and cyberspace. It is hoped that by understanding
the relationship between international law, borders, and sovereignty,
this will assist us in understanding how legal governance in cyberspace
emerges and is shaped.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW, BORDERS, TERRITORY, AND
STATES
A cursory look at any international law textbook reveals the
relationship between international law and states. International law
is traditionally defined as the law that regulates the relations between
states as sovereign formations. According to Vattel “[t]he law of nations
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is the law of sovereigns”1 and according to a contemporary textbook
“[p]ublic international law covers relations between states in all their
myriad forms …”2 This immediately raises the question of what is a
state and what is the relationship between states, borders, and territory
in international law.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States3 provides a definition of ‘state’ by identifying its constitutive
elements. According to Article 1 of the Convention, “the State as a
person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
(1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government; and
(4) capacity to enter into relations with other states.”
Notwithstanding any criticism of under-inclusiveness leveled against
this definition, it has acquired customary law status4 not only because
it codified views already existing at the time of its adoption but also
because, since its adoption, it has been confirmed on many occasions
in international jurisprudence. For example, as early as 1929, it was
opined in the Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft arbitration that
“[a] State does not exist unless it fulfills the conditions of possessing a
territory, a people inhabiting that territory, and a public power which
is exercised over the people and the territory.”5 More recently, the
Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia6
Emer de Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliques à
la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, [The Law of Nations, or,
Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and
Sovereigns] translated by Charles G. Fenwick, Carnegie Institution of Washington,
1916), in Classics of International Law, para xvi. [hereafter referred to as DdG]
2
Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., CUP, 2003, p. 2.
3
The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed on 26 December
1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934) art. 1; James Crawford,
The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 2006; James
Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 48, 1977, p. 93-182.
4
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law
Institute, 1987, § 201.
5
Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellshaft v. Polish State (Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal) 1 August 1929, 5 ILR 11, p. 14-15.
6
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1,
reprinted in Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee a Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, EJIL vol 1, no. 3, 1992, p. 182.
1
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opined that “the state is commonly defined as a community which
consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political
authority and that such a state is characterised by sovereignty”.
The requirement of defined territory in Article 1 of the Convention
alludes to borders. Defined territory means demarcated territory that
is, discrete territory separated from other territories. 7 If this element
in the Montevideo definition of states is combined with the element of
government, territory represents the container over which an authority
exercises supreme and exclusive power8 demarcate the geographic,
personal and functional scope of such power and distinguish said
territory from other territories over which different authorities exercise
exclusive power. Put slightly differently, the territory is the substratum
of state authority whereas borders define the allocation of authority
between states. As Allen Buchanan put it “territory [means] the area that
is circumscribed by boundaries of political units. Land is a geographical
concept; the territory is political and, more specifically, a judicial
concept.”9 The total, supreme and exclusive power over such territory
is called sovereignty. The state as an institution thus embodies a claim
of sovereignty over certain territory.10 In the words of Judge Humber in
Although borders need not be precisely defined as for states to emerge, there needs
to be, at least, a continuous and defined portion of territory over which power is exercised. As the ICJ held in the North Seas Continental Shelf cases: “The appurtenance
of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs the precise delimitation
of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial
rights. There is, for instance, no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully
delimitated and defined, and often in various places and for long periods they are not,
as is shown by the case of the entry of Albania into the League of Nations.” North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands), 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 32.
8
For Crawford, the requirement of territory is merely a component of the effective
government criterion rather than a “distinct criterion of its own.” Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, see note 4, p. 52
9
Allen Buchanan, “The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has
to Say” in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, eds., States, Nations, and Borders:
The Ethics of Making Boundaries, CUP, 2003, p. 232-3.
10
Stephen D. Krasner, “Westphalia and All That” in Judith Goldstein and Robert
Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change,
Cornell University Press, 1993; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press 1999; Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International
Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, International Organization, vol. 55, no. 2,
7

526

The Territorialisation of Cyberspace

the Isle of Palmas case “territorial sovereignty serves to divide between
nations space upon which human activities are employed”.11
Although territorial borders are now synonymous with states and
international law, this has not always been the case. It was the Peace of
Westphalia of 1648 that is credited with the emergence of the modern
concept of the state by recognising the exclusivity of political authority
over distinct portions of territory.12
Whether this is the case can be debated but the attribution of the
modern system of sovereign states to the Peace of Westphalia is one of
the foundational myths of international law13 and it is not my purpose to
debunk this myth. Instead, my purpose is to use the Peace of Westphalia
as a temporal marker in order to explain and compare the pre-and postWestphalian state of affairs as far as the relationship between authority,
territory, and borders is concerned.
The pre-Westphalian order was characterised by a different
organisation of authority which was not necessarily territorial or
exclusive. That period was characterised by the unity of the Respublica
Christiana with its segmented, often overlapping, and complex system
of authority. Authority in that period was not over spaces but over places
such as cities or over people through allegiances.14 There were also
overlapping authorities within the same formation with the Pope being
the highest authority without however yielding claim to any territory.
What characterised these arrangements of authority was the fact that they
were based on the notion of control and allegiance and thus obscured
distinctions between external and internal authority which, as was said,
define the modern concept of statehood and of international law. The
concept of international law that applied in that period was closer to
the Roman concept of jus gentium as the common law that applied to
2001; Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948”, The American Journal of
International Law, vol. 42, no. 1, 1948, p. 20.
11
Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas) (United States v Netherlands), 4 April 1928,
RIAA II 839.
12
Peace of Westphalia, signed on 30 January 1648 and 24 October 1648.
13
Pope Innocent X condemned the treaty as “null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust,
damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time.” David Maland,
Europe in the Seventeenth Century, Macmillan, 1966, p. 16.
14
Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, Volume 2, University of Chicago Press, 196.
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all people regardless of affiliation, place or situation15 rather than the
law that applied to territorially separate authorities which represents the
modern (post-Westphalian) definition of international law.16
Grotius and Vattel, the ‘fathers’ of international law, provided
theoretical support to the notion of sovereign, territorially bounded,
states.17 They were both writing in an era where political theorists such
as Bodin or Hobbes promoted sovereignty as an organising principle of
political entities. Sovereignty for Bodin represented the consolidation
of power: from fragmentation of powers, towards a central authority.18
Whereas these theorists explored the internal aspects of sovereignty,
Grotius and Vattel explored the external dimension and implications
of sovereignty. Grotius decoupled authority and, thus sovereignty,
from people or from the universal society. The former construction of
authority was grounded on notions of personal allegiance and popular
legitimacy whereas the latter was purely normative, based on political
or religious allegiances among people. Both constructions of authority
were subjective and, even more critically, fragmented and complexified
the basis and scope of political authority. In Grotius work, sovereignty
became conterminous with the territory and with the state as the
political institution representing that territory.19 In doing so, Grotius
objectified and simplified the organisation and practice of sovereignty
in that sovereignty as authority ceased to be dependent on affiliations
or on allegiance but was determined by territorial borders which are
physical and tangible. As a result, all persons and objects within borders
fell under a state’s exclusive authority, irrespective of any religious,
ethnic or other bonds and allegiances they may have had. Moreover,
15

Justinian, The Institutes of Justinian, book 1, 15th ed., translation by Thomas Collett Sandars, Longmans

1922, tit. II, para. 1. See also David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity, CUP, 2001, p. 1-15.

Henry Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America: From the
Earliest Times to the Treaty of Washington, 1842, Gould, Bank & Company, 1845, p.
26.
17
Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and
Its Relation to Modern Ideas, Peter Smith, 1970, p. 92-108.
18
Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la Republique, Chez Iacques du Puys, 1576, livre I, ch.
8, p. 131; F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed., CUP, 1986.
19
Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis [The Law of War and Peace in Three Books],
translation by Francis W. Kelsey, book 1, ch. III, § VII, Prolegomena, §§ 35-40, Clarendon Press, 1925.
16
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borders cut off any bonds and allegiances that may have existed with
peoples living outside those borders, thus consolidating the exclusivity
of state authority. For Vattel, the state is central tenet in his theory.20
Vattel ponders on the legal implications of state sovereignty by relying
on natural law concepts of independence and equality. As he wrote,
civil societies require an “authority capable of giving commands,
prescribing laws, and compelling those who refuse to obey. ... Such
an idea is not to be thought of as between Nations. Each independent
State claims to be, and actually is, independent of all others.”21 As a
result, “the State, remains absolutely free and independent with respect
to all other men, and all other Nations, as long as it has not voluntarily
submitted to them.”22
Although the process of state consolidation was gradual, the
Westphalian conceptualisation of statehood as supreme and exclusive
authority over a defined territory and its people - having dissolved any
competing internal authorities – and externally recognising no other
higher authority is omnipresent in international law.
How this conceptualisation of statehood still defines international
law can be demonstrated by looking into claims to statehood in the
exercise of the right to self-determination in the colonial and postcolonial context.23
The right to self-determination denotes the right of peoples to
determine freely their political status. At the basis of this right,
particularly in the colonial era, is a claim to political authority over
a certain territory which often leads to the formation of a new state.
Borders have always played an important role in determining and
DdG, see note 2, vol. III, para. 7a, note k.
DdG, see note 2 ,vol III, para. 8a
22
DdG, see note 2, para. lv-lvi.
23
Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, art. 1(2), 55; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966 (entered into force 3 January 1976), art 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art. 1(1);
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, (14
December 1960) UNGA Res 1514 (XV); Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations, 24 October 1970) UN GA Res. 2625 (XXV);
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995,
p. 102.
20
21
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shaping this right and, particularly, in determining not only the subject
of the right to self-determination but also its content and scope. In
the colonial context, the right to self-determination meant that it was
colonial people located in areas defined by colonial borders that could
exercise this right within the existing colonial borders, irrespective of
whether the subject of the right -the ‘peoples’ - were a homogenous
group, shared the same identity or had the same aspirations over territory.
Hence, borders and territory determined which people could exercise
the right to self-determination as well as the territorial scope of the right
and of the ensuing state authority, contrary to Judge Dillard’s musing
that “It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and
not the territory the destiny of the people”.24 The critical role of borders
in the self-determination context was also confirmed by the principle
of uti possidetis accepted by the then Organisation of African States25
and by international jurisprudence. This principle confined the new
states that emerged from the exercise of the right to self-determination
to the previously drawn colonial borders irrespective of how arbitrary
or artificial those borders may have been, and, regardless of whether
they represented the territory over which the ‘peoples’ claiming selfdetermination lived. Existing borders thus acted as law stabilisers and
allowed new states to be immediately integrated into international law.
As the ICJ opined, “the principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial
title; it stops the clock but does not put back the hands”.26 The ICJ
further explained the role of uti possidetis27
“24. . . . There is no doubt that the obligation to respect preexisting international frontiers in the event of a State succession
derives from a general rule of international law, whether or not the
rule is expressed in the formula uti possidetis. […]
25. However, it may be wondered how the time-hallowed principle
has been able to withstand the new approaches to international law as
Western Sahara (Separate opinion of Judge Dillard), 16 October 1975, ICJ reports
1975, p. 122.
25
Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government Held in Cairo (Resolution 16(1), Border Disputes Among African States), 17 to 21 July 1964.
26
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 22 December 1986, ICJ Reports 1986 p. 568.
27
Ibid, p. 564.
24
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expressed in Africa, where the successive attainment of independence
and the emergence of new States have been accompanied by a
certain questioning of traditional international law. At first sight this
principle conflicts outright with another one, the right of peoples
to self-determination. In fact, however, the maintenance of the
territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the wisest course, to
preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for
their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive
the continent of the gains achieved by many sacrifices. The essential
requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually
to consolidate their independence in all fields, have induced African
States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers,
and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of selfdetermination of peoples.”
The role of borders was also critical in the post-colonial exercise of
the right to self-determination by peoples living within federal states. In
this case, internal administrative borders which were drawn to delimit
internal administrative competences were transformed into external
borders, delimiting sovereign authorities and thus triggering the
application of international law.28 The Arbitration Commission of the
European Conference on Yugoslavia in an influential pronouncement
declared that
“it is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right
to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers
at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the
states concerned agree otherwise”.29
The Commission also held in Opinion No. 3 that
“[e]xcept where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become
frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion follows from
the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and in particular
from the principle of uti possidetis. […]”30
“[I]t has to be remembered that no question of international boundaries could even
have occurred to the minds of those servants of die Spanish Crown who established
administrative boundaries” Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/
Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 11 September 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 387-8
29
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2,
reprinted in Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee a Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, EJIL vol 1, no. 3, 1992, p. 184.
30
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 3,
reprinted in Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee a Sec28
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The preceding discussion also reveals the constitutive and functional
role of borders in international law. In the process of state formation,
borders demarcate actual claims to political authority over territories
and in doing so they also contribute to the consolidation, unification,
and centralisation of such authority. A state thus denotes the horizontal
and vertical integration of authority over a certain territory. In this
sense, borders are constitutive of states. Because borders define states
and states are the foundational authority of international law, borders
are also constitutive of international law; without states, international
law would lack ontological meaning. They are also constitutive of
international law because states are the genitor of international law;
they create, implement and enforce international law.
Furthermore, borders determine the political and geographic scope
of a state’s authority by demarcating it from other authorities and
they also demarcate the internal from the external dimension of state
authority. In doing so they determine when and where international
law applies to endow international law with functional relevance. The
functional role of borders is also evident in the application of different
law regimes or in relation to certain international rules such as the rules
on non-intervention, non-use of force or self-defence which rely on the
crossing of borders - physical or political-legal – to acquire meaning
and relevance.31 For example, whether the law of international armed
conflict or the law of non-international armed conflict applies in a
particular situation depends on whether the hostilities cross a frontier.
Similarly, the rule on non-intervention applies and acquires meaning
when there is a physical crossing of a frontier or interference with the
internal aspects of sovereignty. In this sense, borders determine what
falls within and what fall outside a state’s sovereignty which is also
critical in determining what is permissible and what is impermissible
intervention. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 makes this clear when it says
“violation of sovereignty occurs whenever one State physically
crosses into the territory or national airspace of another State without
either its consent or another justification in international law […]”.32
.
ond Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, EJIL vol 1, no. 3, 1992, p. 185.
31
Charter of the United Nations, see note 24, art. 2(4) and 51.
32
Michael N. Schmitt, ed., see note 51, rule 4 para. 6.
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Whereas this section has explored the relationship between
international law, states, territory, and borders, the next section will
consider the viability of this relationship in cyberspace.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW, BORDERS, AND TERRITORY IN
CYBERSPACE
A common representation of cyberspace is that it is a-territorial and
borderless and that for this reason, it cannot be subject to the law as
recognised and practiced in the physical world. Instead, cyberspace is
subject to different legal constructions. John Barlow’s Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace33 set the scene by rejecting the application
of sovereignty and its concomitant laws to cyberspace. According to the
declaration:
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one,
….. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no
moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement
we have true reason to fear.
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. […]
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. […]
We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will
arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world
is different.
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought
itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications.
Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not
where bodies live.
[…]
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement,
and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and
there is no matter here.
John P Barlow, “A Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace” (Davos, 1996),
available at: https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence, accessed on 24 August
2017
33
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Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain
order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened
self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our
identities may be distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The
only law that all our constituent cultures would generally recognize
is the Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to build our particular
solutions on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are
attempting to impose. […]
These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us
in the same position as those previous lovers of freedom and
self-determination who had to reject the authorities of distant,
uninformed powers. We must declare our virtual selves immune to
your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over
our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one
can arrest our thoughts.
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May
it be more humane and fair than the world your governments have
made before.”
The debate between Professors Johnston and Post on one hand
and Professor Goldsmith on the other as to whether law and, more
specifically, international law applies to cyberspace and how that law is
created, applied and enforced is informed by different views about the
role and relevance of borders and of territorially bounded sovereignty
in cyberspace.34
Johnson and Post reject the possibility of applying existing notions of
sovereignty and law to cyberspace due to its distinct non-territorial and
borderless character and, for this reason, they propose the development
of discrete laws for cyberspace.35 According to them, in the physical
world, borders determine the law that applies within a certain space
and there is an overlap between the physical space represented by states
and the ‘law-space’. However, the borderless character of cyberspace
undermines the possibility of legal regulation because it challenges
David R. Johnson & David Post, “Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review, 48, 1996, p. 1367; David Post, “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 4, 2002, p. 1365; Jack
L. Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy”, University of Chicago Law Review, 65, 1998
p. 1199; Jack L. Goldsmith, “The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
Sovereignty”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 5, no. 2., 1998, p. 475.
35
David R. Johnson & David Post, see note 34, p. 1367.
34
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the bases upon which law is created and applied. More specifically
cyberspace destroys the link between borders and four critical variables,
to wit, power, legitimacy, effects, and notice.36 Power as an authority is
as was said the essence of sovereignty and of statehood but the lack
of borders deprives sovereigns of the ability to exercise power over
defined territories and peoples and deprives sovereigns the legitimising
effect of consent. The lack of borders also obscures the links between a
cyber activity and a certain ‘law-space’ and undermines the exclusivity
of power. It also deprives people from noticing when they enter a
different ‘law space’. All the above pose challenges to law and, although
cyberspace needs to be regulated, existing territorially based laws are
not suitable to cyberspace. For this reason, the authors opt for a system
of self-regulation of cyberspace by its participants.37
Notwithstanding the forcefulness of their argument, it should be
noted that Johnston’s and Post’s argument is not as radical as it seems
because they do not reject the application of law or of international law
to cyberspace and, moreover, they still rely on borders for purposes
of law-creation, law-application and law-enforcement in cyberspace,
albeit a different kind of borders. To explain, they do not deny that law
has a role to play in cyberspace but they propose a different regulatory
system which is more appropriate to the features of cyberspace.
Secondly, although they reject the possibility of applying existing laws
and law-making processes to cyberspace because they are territoriallygrounded and they are based on notions of physical borders, they do
not reject the existence of borders in cyberspace. Instead, the authors
introduce a different border consisting of screens and passwords which
distinguish the virtual from the real world. This may be a monumental
and non-physical border but a border nonetheless. Moreover, according
to the authors, this border is placed around cyberspace and thus defines
cyberspace as a space separate from real space. What transpires is that
borders still play a constitutive as well as a functional role because they
define the expanse that is called cyberspace and they determine what
falls within the real and what falls within the virtual space. Thirdly,
borders continue to define the organisation of power within cyberspace
as a separate space. The difference with the physical world of states
36
37

Ibid, p. 1370-6.
Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books 2006) p. 3.
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is that, whereas in the latter case authority is organised and practiced
within defined territories with no overarching power existing above
them, in cyberspace, authority is unmediated, non-fragmented and
conterminous with the borders of cyberspace.
Johnson’s and Post’s position concerning the exceptional nature of
cyberspace was challenged by Jack Goldsmith in his article “Against
cyber anarchy”.38 For him, there is nothing unexceptional as far as
cyberspace is concerned and that contrary views are much exaggerated.
What, according to Goldsmith, needs to be realised is that cyberspace
consists of persons and objects; thus states can exercise power over
people and objects on their territory and regulate their activities. Such
regulation has also by default extraterritorial effects expanding in this
way the state’s regulatory power extraterritorially. Furthermore, there is
an extension of the territorial scope of the law when the state regulates
the local effects of extraterritorial activities. According to Goldsmith,
traditional legal tools can resolve the multi-jurisdictional problems that
arise and also address the issue of legitimacy and validity of the law.
With regard to law-enforcement, Goldsmith criticises Johnson and Post
for confusing the ability to enforce the law which exists in cyberspace
with the cost of enforcement; for failing to recognize the deterrent effect
of local enforcement; and for building their critique upon a notion of
near-perfect enforcement. For him, the standard rules of enforcement
based on a person’s location, on personal jurisdiction or extradition can
also apply to cyber activities. Regarding the issue of notice, Goldsmith
says that there is a general notice that data may cross frontiers. In sum,
according to Goldsmith, territorial sovereigns can regulate cyberspace
through existing techniques. Goldsmith furthermore makes a distinction
between mandatory laws that apply across the board and default laws
that apply to specific situations and may also apply to cyberspace, for
example, the law concerning technical standards.
The above represent views expressed at the early days of legal
encounters with cyberspace and, as was explained, accept explicitly or
implicitly the role of physical or normative borders in the application of
the law to cyberspace.
By now it is broadly accepted that international law applies to
38

Jack L. Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy”, see note 34, p. 1199.
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cyberspace. For example, the 2013 report of the United Nations Group
of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information
and telecommunications in the context of international security [GGE]
affirmed that international law, especially the UN Charter, applies to
cyberspace and that State sovereignty and international norms and
principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICTrelated activities, and to jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within
a State’s territory.39 According to the UN Secretary-General, the
recommendations contained in the report “point the way forward for
anchoring ICT security in the existing framework of international law and
understandings that govern State relations and provide the foundation
for international peace and security”.40 The 2015 GGE Report went a
step further by spelling out specific international norms and principles
that apply or should apply to cyberspace. The report lists 11 voluntary,
non-binding norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States
aimed at promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT
environment. They are the following:41
1. States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to
increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent
ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may
pose threats to international peace and security;
2. states should consider all relevant information in case of ICT
incidents including the larger context of the event, the challenges
of attribution in the ICT environment and the nature and extent
of the consequences
3. states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs;
4. states should consider how best to cooperate to exchange
information, to assist each other, and to prosecute terrorist and
criminal use of ICTs
5. states should respect the UN resolutions that are linked to human
UNGA, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”, 24 June
2013, UN Doc A/68/98, paras. 19-20.
40
Ibid, p. 4.
41
UNGA, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”, 22 July
2015, UN Doc A/70/174, para. 13.
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rights on the internet and to the right to privacy in the digital age
6. states should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity
contrary to its obligations under international law that
intentionally damages critical infrastructure;
7. states should take appropriate measures to protect their critical
infrastructure from ICT threats;
8. states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by
other states whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious
ICT acts;
9. states should take steps to ensure supply chain security, and
should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT and
the use of harmful hidden functions;
10. states should encourage responsible reporting of ICT
vulnerabilities and should share remedies to these.
11. states should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm
the information systems of another state’s emergency response
teams (CERT/CSIRTS) and should not use their own teams for
malicious international activity;
Furthermore, the list of international law principles applicable to
cyberspace includes42:
1. state sovereignty;
2. sovereign equality;
3. the settlement of disputes by peaceful means;
4. refraining from the threat or use of force in international
relations;
5. non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states;
6. respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The GGE failed to produce a report in 2017 due to lack of consensus
on how specific norms and principles apply to cyberspace but, that
notwithstanding, previous reports attest to the view that principles and
norms developed for and applicable to the physical world and linked to
42

Ibid, para 26.

538

The Territorialisation of Cyberspace

territorially bounded spaces are deemed to apply to cyberspace. This
phenomenon can be described as the territorialisation of cyberspace;
namely the application to cyberspace of territorialist and, by
consequence, of sovereigns notions of authority and law.43
IV. THE TERRITORIALISATION OF CYBERSPACE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In order to explain the epistemic premises of this phenomenon, it is
important to explain the nature of cyberspace and whether cyberspace
falls within the categorical schemes of territory and state sovereignty
which, as explained above, define international law. According to Kuehl
cyberspace is
“a global domain within the information environment whose
distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics
and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange,
and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected
networks using information-communication technologies”.44
It transpires from this definition that cyberspace has a physical layer
which consists of computers, integrated circuits, cables, communications
infrastructure and the like; a logical layer which consists of the software
logic data packets and electronics45 and a social layer which includes
human beings. Consequently, a state can extend its sovereignty over
the physical layer that is, over the infrastructure located on its territory.
It can also exercise sovereign power over the social layer that is, over
persons on its territory. The state can also assert its sovereignty over
the effects of cyber activities that are felt on its territory regardless
of their provenance. Furthermore, the state can assert its sovereignty
over information that passes through its infrastructure or begins or
Nicholas Tsagourias, “The Legal Status of Cyberspace” in Nicholas Tsagourias
& Russell Buchan, eds., Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace,
Edward Elgar, 2015; Geoffrey Herrera, “Cyberspace and Sovereignty: Thoughts on
Physical Space and Digital Space”, in Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Victor Mauer, Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, eds., Power and Security in the Information Age: Investigating
the Role of the State in Cyberspace, Ashgate, 2007, p. 67-93.
44
Daniel T Kuehl, “From cyberspace to cyberpower: Defining the problem” in Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, Larry K Wentz, eds., Cyberpower and National Security (National Defense University Press, 2009, p. 28. [italics in the original]
45
Lior Tobanksy, “Basic concepts in cyber warfare”, Military and Strategic Affairs,
vol. 3, no. 1, 2011, p. 77-78.
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ends on its territory. All the above show that existing international law
norms which are territorially bounded can extend to and regulate cyber
activities.
This phenomenon can be understood better by using the alleged
Russian interference in the 2016 US elections as an example.46 The
incident involved hacking into the Democratic National Committee
emails and the release by WikiLeaks of emails with information
to embarrass or undermine the campaign of Hillary Clinton, the
Democratic candidate. The incident thus involved the use of cyber
infrastructure and cyber means to influence the US political process. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued a joint statement claiming that
the Russian government was responsible for the hack and publication
of the materials in its attempt to “interfere with the US election
process.”47 According to reports, President Obama told President Putin
that “international law, including the law for armed conflict, applies to
actions in cyberspace”48 and considered US responses to the incident.
The FBI49 report Joint Analysis Report: GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian
Malicious Cyber Activity reinforced the view that Russia was behind
the WikiLeaks releases. Furthermore, according to the report Assessing
Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic
Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, the intention of the leaks was to
Jens David Ohlin, “Did Russian Cyber interference in the 2016 Election Violate
International Law?” Texas Law Review, no. 95, 2017.
47
Director of National Intelligence, “Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security” (7 October 2016), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/jointstatement-department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national, accessed on
24 August 2017.
48
William M. Arkin, Ken Dilanian & Cynthia McFadden, “What Obama Said to
Putin on the Red Phone About the Election Hack”, NBC News (19 December 2016),
available at:
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-obama-said-putin-red-phone-aboutelection-hackn697116, accessed on 24 August 2017.
49
U.S. Department of Homeland Security & Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joint
Analysis Report: GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian Malicious Cyber Activity” (29 December 2016), available at: https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZL Y%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf, accessed on 24 August
2017.
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“undermine public faith in the US democratic process.”50
Departing from the assumption that Russia was responsible for
the hacking, the incident implicates two international law principles
identified by the GGE as being applicable to cyberspace: one is
the principle of sovereignty and the other is the principle of nonintervention.51 These two principles are central to and, indeed,
manifestations of the territorially-bound approach to international law.
The principle of sovereignty denotes “the collection of rights held
by a state”.52 These rights cover the internal as well as the external
aspects of state sovereignty. As explained above, the internal aspect
of sovereignty denotes summa potestas over territory and people;53
that is, exclusive and supreme authority to regulate comprehensively
human action and to enforce the law within a certain territory.54 The
external aspect of sovereignty denotes the state’s supreme, original and
total power in its international relations. Being all-encompassing, the
principle of sovereignty can be dissected into more specific principles
rights with non-intervention being one such specific right which has
acquired independent legal status.55 Non-intervention protects the
ICA, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” in
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Background to “Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber
Incident Attribution” (6 January 2017) ICA 2017-01D, p. 1, available at: https://www.
dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf accessed on 24 August 2017.
51
For the application of these principles to cyberspace see Michael N. Schmitt, ed.,
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, CUP,
2017, rules 1-4, rule 66.
52
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., OUP, 2012,
50

p. 448.

Samantha Besson, “Sovereignty” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, OUP, 2012.
54
“In short, authority concerns rule-making and control, rule-enforcement.” Janice
E. Thomson, “State sovereignty in international relations: Bridging the gap between
theory and empirical research”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 2, 1995,
p. 213, 223.
55
Montevideo Convention, see note 4, art. 8; UNGA, “Declaration on Inadmissibility
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of the Independence and Sovereignty” 21 December 1965, UN Doc A/RES/20/2131; Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, see note 24; Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of
America), 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, paras. 202, 204.
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internal dimension of sovereignty56 By prohibiting any coercive
interference into the domestic affairs of a state.57 This has been expressed
in the 1965 UN General Assembly resolution in the following words:
“no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal […] affairs of any other state” and every “state
has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and
cultural systems without interference in any form by another state’ As
the ICJ also said in the Nicaragua case
“the principle [of non-intervention] forbids all States or groups
of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external
affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly
be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the
principle of State sovereignty to decide freely”.58
The ICJ went on to offer examples of matters that fall within a
state’s sovereign prerogative such as the choice of a political, economic,
social and cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy. The
list is not exhaustive59 and can change depending on developments in
international law and relations but, if a state’s sovereign prerogatives
are unduly compromised, the principle of non-intervention is violated.
Applying the above considerations to the case at hand, would
Russia’s alleged interference amount to unlawful intervention into
US domestic affairs? According to Former Department of State Legal
Adviser Brian Egan “a cyber operation by a State that interferes
with another State’s ability to hold an election or that manipulates a
State’s election results would be a clear violation of the rule of nonintervention”.60 That notwithstanding, whether this is the case depends
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, para.
251: “The effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty inevitably overlap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of nonintervention.”
57
Hersch Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim’s International Law: a treatise, vol. 1, D.
McKay, 1955, p. 305; Robert Jennings and Adam Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Longman, 1996) p. 432.
58
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, para.
205.
59
Ibid.
60
Brian J. Egan, “Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace at
Berkeley Law School” (10 November 2016), available at: https://www.law.berkeley.
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on affirmatively answering two sub-questions: first, whether Russia’s
action impinged on sovereign prerogatives; and, second, whether it
was coercive. With regard to the first sub-question, the choice of a
political system and the choice of government is a state prerogative;
it is one of the highest manifestations of internal sovereignty. Hence,
to the extent that Russia’s actions were intended to interfere with the
political process of electing the next US President, they would have
impinged on sovereign matters which should remain immune from
outside interference. The answer to the second sub-question - whether
the interference was coercive – is more nuanced. Coercion means that
the will of the state is manipulated in order to do something that it would
not otherwise do. Coercion is not the same as influence or interference
but it is imperative pressure to do or to abstain from doing something.
Put in different words, it is not an interference in sovereign prerogatives
that constitutes unlawful intervention but interference in sovereign
prerogatives that rises to the level of compulsion.61 Consequently,
the answer to the question of whether Russian interference in the
US electoral process constitutes intervention depends on whether the
US electorate was actually compelled to vote for someone that they
would not otherwise have voted for. In my opinion, Russia’s actions
did not reach that threshold; they may have influenced some voters
but it seems to not have compelled voters to change their mind since
the targeted candidate - Hillary Clinton - received more votes than her
opponent.62 The conclusion would have been different however if there
was tampering with the voting machines.
If Russia’s meddling does not constitute unlawful intervention into
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-111016.pdf, accessed on 24
August 2017.
61
Dov H. Levin,
“When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results”, International Studies Quarterly, vol 60, no 2, 2016, p.
189–202. [it uses the word intervention in generic sense and not in the legal sense]
62
Harriet Agerholm, “Hillary Clinton’s lead over Donald Trump in popular vote
passes 2.5 million” (2 December 2016), available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/us-elections/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-popular-vote-lead25-million-a7451661.html, accessed on 24 August 2017. Contra Steven J. Barela,
“Cross-Border Cyber Ops to Erode Legitimacy: An Act of Coercion”, (12 January
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US domestic affairs in the absence of coercion, will it amount to a
violation of the principle of sovereignty? The view that it violated US
sovereignty has been put forward by certain commentators.63 Whether
this so depends on the content of the principle of sovereignty and on
whether it is a legal norm, triggering legal consequences.
As explained above, sovereignty is a ‘catch-all’ principle which can
be dissected into more specific norms but remains the fall-back principle
that captures any interference within a state’s exclusive internal and
external authority which is not captured by other more specific rules
such as those on non-intervention or non-use of force. For example,
in the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ determined that US over flights of
Nicaragua which did not constitute uses of force or intervention violated
Nicaragua’s sovereignty.64 Hence, any interference in a state’s political
process or decision-making power would violate its sovereignty even if
it does not rise to the level of intervention. Moreover, any unauthorised
interference with a state’s cyber infrastructure affecting its function
or integrity would constitute a violation of that state’s sovereignty.
That having been said, the next question is whether the principle
of sovereignty is a legal norm whose violation can produce legal
consequences. Sovereignty is often referred to as a principle or a norm,
both alluding to its more general nature in contrast to rules which are
specific prescriptions or proscriptions. This fact alone or the fact that
it has not been codified does not deprive it of legal status. Sovereignty
constitutes a customary law norm having been recognised as such
by states and courts. The ICJ has, for example, treated sovereignty
as a legal norm in the Corfu Channel case where the Court held that
“Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an
essential foundation of international relations” and it went on by saying
that “ … to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ,
the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a
violation of Albanian sovereignty”.65 Likewise, in the Nicaragua case
Sean Watts, “International Law and Proposed U.S. Responses to the D.N.C. Hack”
(14 October 2016), available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/33558/internationallaw-proposed-u-s-responses-d-n-c-hack, accessed on 24 August 2017.
64
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, paras
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Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania),
9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 35, 36.
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the Court held that US over flights violate Nicaragua’s sovereignty.66
In Costa Rica/Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that by “excavating three
carios and establishing a military presence on Costa Rican territory,
Nicaragua has violated the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica”.67
It follows from the above that to the extent that sovereignty is a legal
norm, interference with the US political process and the unauthorised
entry into its cyber infrastructure to retrieve emails would amount to a
violation of US sovereignty.
V. REALIGNING SOVEREIGNTY AND CYBERSPACE
The preceding discussion has shown how international rules based
on territorially-bound notions of sovereignty can apply to cyberspace.
In this section, I will explain how states realign their sovereignty to
cyberspace and in particular how states assert their sovereignty in
cyberspace by curving out cyberspace into distinct areas corresponding
to national territorial borders. Although, as was said previously, the
application of the principle of sovereignty to cyberspace has been
broadly accepted, certain states have particularly insisted on the notion
of cyber sovereignty as the centrepiece of their political and legal
approach to cyberspace and to cyber-regulation. China is such a state.68
In 2010 a White Paper entitled “The Internet in China” was published
which stressed the sovereign implications of the internet.69 In 2015,
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see note 53, para 251.
Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua
v. Costa Rica), 16 December 2015, ICJ Reports 2015, para. 229.
68
Hao Yeli, “A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty”, Prism: Journal of
the Center for Complex Operations, vol 7, no. 2 (2017), 109, available at: http://cco.
ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/ prism_7-2/10-3-Perspective%20Theory.pdf
accessed on 24 August 2017
69
“The Internet in China” (White Paper, 8 June 2010) available at: http://en.people.
cn/90001/90776/90785/7017201.html accessed on 24 August 2017, “IV. Basic Principles and Practices of Internet Administration:
[…] China advocates the rational use of technology to curb dissemination of illegal
information online. Based on the characteristics of the Internet and considering the
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China and Russia together with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan, submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations a
proposal of an ‘International Code of Conduct for Information Security’
which contained a pledge to respect the ‘sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of all States’.70 Chinese President
Xi Jinping stressed the importance of cyber-sovereignty during his
address to the Second World Internet Conference in Wuzhen in 2015
and claimed that cyber sovereignty is critical to national sovereignty.71
At the 7th International Safe Internet Forum conference in 2016, Fang
BinXing member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and chief
architect of China’s Golden Shield Project (Firewall) said ‘Sovereignty
in general, and digital sovereignty in particular, is the inherent right
of every nation and its citizens.’72 In 2016, China’s Ministry of Foreign
illegal information on state security, public interests and minors. The Decision of
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Guarding Internet Security,
Regulations on Telecommunications of the People’s Republic of China, Measures on
the Administration of Internet Information Services, Measures on the Administration
of Security Protection of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks, and other laws and regulations clearly prohibit the spread of information that
contains contents subverting state power, undermining national unity, infringing upon
national honor and interests, inciting ethnic hatred and secession, advocating heresy,
pornography, violence, terror and other information that infringes upon the legitimate
rights and interests of others. According to these regulations, basic telecommunication
business operators and Internet information service providers shall establish Internet
security management systems and utilize technical measures to prevent the transmission of all types of illegal information.”
Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia
n Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General A/69/723 (13 January 2015)
70
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htm accessed on 24 August 2017
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Affairs and the Cyberspace Administration of China jointly released
a White Paper, ‘International strategy of cooperation on cyberspace’,
which asserts that, as a basic norm in international relations, the principle
of territorial sovereignty includes cyberspace.73 The protection of
sovereignty in cyberspace is also one of the ways for ensuring national
security according to the Law of Cyber-security of China.74
China deploys the principle of cyber sovereignty in order to stress
the need for an inter-governmental approach to cyber regulation in
contradistinction to the mainly western multi-stakeholder approach and
it also deploys the principle of sovereignty in order to protect its internal
sovereignty in the sense of protecting its exclusive and supreme power
over its territory and people.75 In the latter instance, cyber sovereignty
for China denotes power over the state’s cyber infrastructure and over
the information entering or becoming available within its sovereign
domain. The manner in which China asserts its cyber sovereignty is
through filtering, Filtering involves technical, political, legal, or social
techniques to deny access to certain information or activities from the
state or deny such information or activities entry into the sovereign
space of a state. For example, the content of information is filtered on
the basis of political, social, security or other grounds.76 Such national
Available at: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-03/02/content_28410278.
htm accessed on 24 August 2017
74
Available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-new-cybersecurity-law accessed on
24 August 2017
75
Yi Shen “Cyber Sovereignty and the Governance of Global
Cyberspace:
Chin.
Polit.
Sci.
Rev.
(2016),
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sovereignty
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first
key parts of cyber sovereignty refers to the sovereignty of the state to manage the
information flow inside the territory; the second is that every single state has the
power to make cyber related policy independently; the third is that every state
should have roughly equalized rights to participate in the decision making process
of the rules, norms, or code of conduct that governs global cyberspace; and the
respect of sovereignty should be one of the most important guiding principles to
deal with cyber related issues internationally’.
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restrictions and control over the flow of information was dubbed as the
‘Great Firewall of China’ or less charitably as “information curtain”.77
A more advanced method of asserting sovereignty in cyberspace
is the creation of national cyberspace zones by disconnecting national
networks from the world wide web and by creating a national internet.
North Korea’s ‘Kwangmyong’ internet or Iran’s ‘Halal internet’ are
such examples.78 The North Korean internet consists of a search engine,
news, email, and a browser and, according to reports, it has only 28
websites.79 Iran’s ‘national internet’ replaces the existing system of
filtering the internet and is based on domestic hosting, internet protocol
network and fibre optic networks.80
These examples show that states can curve their own sovereign
cyberspace by erecting borders through technical means in order to
control activities from outside or in order to insulate national services.81
cyberspace, MIT Press, 2010.
Jill Dougherty & Doug Gross, “Clinton: Internet ‘information curtain’ is dropping”
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These borders correspond to the physical borders delimiting and
defining state sovereignty but they also reaffirm state sovereignty in
its political, social, economic, cultural and territorial organisation.
Above all, it shows how states project the Westphalian concept of state
sovereignty to cyberspace. Whether such a Westphalian ‘moment’ will
lead to the division of cyberspace into sovereign zones depends on
many factors. Whereas technology is an important factor because it can
assist in actually curving cyberspace in the same way that the territorial
notion of sovereignty was facilitated by technological advances such as
in cartography which permitted the demarcation of expanses of territory
in an abstract manner,82 it is mainly political, economic and a number
of other factors that are the primary motivators of such curving. For
example, an open or closed cyberspace depends on political approaches
to regulation, on states’ approaches to sovereignty, on the relationship
between citizens, society and the government as well as on the economic
or other benefits states expect to gain from cyberspace. It is interesting in
this regard to recall how Major General Hao Yeli of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army divides cyber sovereignty into three levels. According
to him, at the bottom level, that of cyberinfrastructure, ‘states should be
willing to collectively transfer authority in the interest of standardization
and interconnectivity’; at the middle level of application ‘the degree of
cyber sovereignty should be adapted to local conditions’ whereas at
the top level of ‘regime, law, political security, and ideology, which is
unchallengeable and includes the governing foundations and embodies the
core interests of the country’, the leading role of the
government remains. 83
Although the above relate to active assertions of sovereignty in
cyberspace, it should be noted that the opposite trend namely, states
not claiming sovereignty in cyberspace or states promoting common
regulatory regimes to maintain the common use of cyberspace84 are
Jordan Branch, The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sovereignty, CUP, 2014.
83
Hao Yeli, “A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty” see note 69, 113-4
84
For cyberspace as a global commons see Dan Hunter, “Cyberspace as place and
the tragedy of the digital anticommons” California Law Review, vol. 91, no. 2, 2003,
p. 439; Abraham M. Denmark & James Mulvenon, eds., Contested Commons: The
Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, Centre for New American Century,
2010.
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also expressions of state sovereignty. Unilateral or collective abstention
from the exercise of sovereign rights as well as voluntary limitations on
sovereign rights are indeed expressions of state sovereignty.85
The question I want to explore is whether cyberspace can itself
become sovereign. If sovereignty represents a claim over a portion of
territory or otherwise over a space, cyberspace is such a space having,
as was said, a physical, logical and social component. The difficulty
however with the idea of sovereign cyberspace is that its physical and
social components can never be disassociated from existing states;
objects and people exist within states. Moreover, whereas in the physical
world people or powerful authorities can claim a portion of territory as
in the exercise of the right to self-determination and, if successful, create
their own state with distinct borders separating themselves from people
and objects residing in other territories, neither objects nor persons
can move to cyberspace and sever their links with their own states.
People may move certain activities and actions to cyberspace, they may
experience cyberspace or they may nooumentally inhabit cyberspace
but they can never remove themselves from the real world. This means
that cyberspace and its organisation cannot be independent of states
and therefore cyberspace cannot be sovereign because the authority
in cyberspace is mediated by states. As for the purely virtual part of
cyberspace, it cannot be sovereign because an inanimate, ethereal,
space cannot be sovereign.
VI.CONCLUSION
The article portrayed constitutive and functional relationship between borders and territory with the institution of the state and international law. Borders were claimed to define territories and further
determine which states and over which sovereignty can be exercised.
Consequently, international law as the creation of sovereign states is
dependent on borders. The article then explored the question of how
the relationship between borders and territory manifests itself in cyberspace. It does so in the process of territorialisation of cyberspace in
Case of the S.S. “Wimbledon” (17 August 1923) PCIJ Reports, Series A, no. 1, p.
25.
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the sense of extending territorial notions of sovereignty and of international law to cyberspace with respect to activities, persons and objects.
This relationship also manifests itself in the curving of national cyber
zones. As to whether cyberspace itself can become sovereign, the article claimed that authority in cyberspace cannot be decoupled from
real people and objects over whom states exercise sovereignty. Consequently, cyberspace cannot be sovereign in itself.
The question then is not whether cyberspace is subject to territorially bounded notions of sovereignty and international law but about
the scope of state sovereignty over cyberspace and in cyberspace. This
is a political question for individual states but also for the society of
states. It is a question whose answer depends on states’ political, legal,
economic, social, and cultural interests, on perceptions about what is
cyberspace or what cyberspace should be and on how states’ interests
are promoted, facilitated or constrained by or in cyberspace.
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